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Off-farm labor supply responses to permanent and transitory farm income 
 
 
A sample of Iowa farm couples is used to evaluate whether off-farm labor supply decisions 
respond to permanent and transitory components of farm income.  Off-farm labor supply of both 
spouses declines in response to increases in permanent farm income.  Farm wives also reduce 
off-farm labor supply in response to positive transitory farm income shocks.  Consequently, one 
mechanism farm households use to smooth their goods consumption when facing fluctuating 
farm income is to modify their consumption of leisure.  Ability to smooth goods consumption 
does not imply the absence of liquidity constraints among farm households unless leisure 
consumption is also smoothed. 
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 Farm households face large fluctuations in farm income due to weather and price shocks.  
In principle, farm households should be able to use futures markets, forward contracts or 
insurance markets to lessen the household’s exposure to price or yield risk.  In addition, 
government intervention in farm gate prices through price supports or loan deficiency payments 
should moderate the magnitude of the fluctuations.  However, evidence suggests that variability 
in farm level net farm income has not diminished since 1933 (Mishra and Sandretto, 2001). 
If they are unable to avoid large swings in farm income, households can still avoid 
similarly large fluctuations in consumption.  As first empirically described by Brady (1952) and 
Reid (1952) and later formalized by Friedman (1957), households may want to consume out of 
permanent income rather than current income.1  By borrowing against future production or past 
savings, a household can smooth its consumption path relative to its income stream.  However, 
doing this requires easy access to credit markets for either borrowing or lending as needed. 
Liquidity constraints are typically presumed to be most serious for households in 
developing countries and in rural areas.  Nevertheless, tests of the permanent income hypothesis 
have typically found evidence supportive of the theory when analyzing consumption choices of 
rural households in India (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1998), Thailand (Paxson, 1992), and the United 
States (Langemeier and Patrick, 1990, 1993).  In contrast, it is often more difficult to reject 
liquidity constraints in consumption patterns of urban households in developed countries (Hall, 
1978; Altonji and Siow, 1987;  Zeldes, 1989). 
In contrast to the tests based on the consumption patterns of agricultural households, tests 
that focus on the capital investment or livestock inventory decisions of farm households have 
generally found evidence of liquidity constraints, at least in trough periods of the business cycle 
and for younger farm households (Bierlen and Featherstone (1998); Bierlen, Barry, Dixon and 
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Ahrendsen(1998); Bierlen, Ahrendsen and Dixon (1998); Benjamin and Phimister (2002)).  
Particularly intriguing is that the findings of Bierlen and his colleagues supporting credit 
constraints are based on the same households that Langemeier and Patrick use to demonstrate the 
lack of credit constraints.  While separability arguments have been used to divorce farm 
production decisions from farm consumption decisions, it seems implausible that a farm 
household can be credit constrained in its capital and inventory decisions but not its consumption 
decisions.   
This paper explores a plausible explanation for how farm production decisions could be 
subject to liquidity constraints, even while consumption decisions appear to be consistent with 
the permanent income hypothesis.  Researchers have argued that farmers adjust their livestock 
inventories or capital investments to absorb farm income shocks.  We argue that farm leisure 
consumption decisions are another avenue by which farm households can absorb farm income 
shocks. 
Evidence that farm households adjust their labor supply in response to unforeseen income 
shocks has been found in developing country settings.  Skoufias (1993) found that adult time on 
the farm in India responded to the weather and size of output.  Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) report 
that child time in school responded negatively to unanticipated negative shocks to household 
income in rural India.  Skoufias and Parker (2002) found that negative shocks to household 
income in urban Mexico led to increased labor supply by adult women in the household.  These 
papers suggest that in the absence of perfect credit markets, farm households can alter their 
consumption of leisure in order to smooth shocks to farm income. 
Farm households have increasingly relied on off-farm income to supplement the returns 
to their farming operations.  Data from Iowa in Table 1 show typical patterns.  Across all farm 
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households with a husband and a wife, 71% have at least one spouse working off the farm and 
43% have both spouses working off the farm.  The probability of having one or both spouses 
working off the farm rises for younger couples:  65% of the youngest farm households have both 
spouses working off the farm compared to 54% for couples where the husband is aged 55-64. 
It is also apparent that off-farm income smooths the path of total income for farmers.  
Mishra and Sandretto (2001) found that off-farm income has served to lower total variability in 
farm household income, even though farm income itself has not fallen in variability.  Carriker et 
al (1993) found that the marginal propensity to consume out of nonfarm income was larger than 
the marginal propensity to consume out of farm income, consistent with a potential role of off-
farm income as a short-term supplement to farm income necessary to smooth commodity 
consumption streams.  Mishra and Goodwin (1997) found that farm off-farm labor responds 
positively to higher probability of farm income shocks.  However, previous studies have not 
tested explicitly whether the adverse shocks to farm income cause off-farm labor supply to 
increase in the United States.2  
This study addresses that issue in the context of  Iowa farm households.  We adapt the 
two-person household model used to analyze off-farm labor supply of husbands and wives3 to 
the question of how unanticipated farm income shocks affect the farm household’s allocation of 
time off the farm.  We find that farm wives are significantly more likely to work off-farm after 
suffering an unforeseen adverse shock to their farm operations.  Farm husbands' off-farm labor 
supply is not sensitive to farm income shocks.  However, the permanent component of farm 
income had similar effects on both farm spouses, with probability of working off-farm declining 
as expected farm income rises.  These results suggest that farm households use reductions in the 
consumption of leisure to replace income lost from adverse shocks to farm income.   As a result, 
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farm households are not perfectly insured against transitory farm income fluctuations.  Previous 
conclusions that these households can smooth consumption and hence do not face liquidity 
constraints may have been misled by ignoring leisure as an element of the consumption stream. 
Theory 
 The jth farm household is assumed to have a joint utility function that includes the leisure 
time of the husband, (t)Lhj ; the leisure time of the wife (t)L
w
j ; and household consumption, Cj(t).  
In each period, the household chooses these items so as to maximize lifetime utility, specified as 
 { }1)t1),(tV(AEβ(t))Z(t),L(t),L(t),U(C jtjjwjhjj +++  (1) 
where Zj(t) is a vector of observed and unobserved household j attributes; jβ  is a discount factor; 
and )V(⋅  is a value function reflecting the optimal future accumulation of household assets as in 
MaCurdy (1985).  The household maximizes (1) subject to constraints on time and on the 
budget.  Normalizing time to 1 per period, the husband’s and wife’s time constraints are 
 wh,i(t);F(t)H(t)L1 ij
i
j
i
j =++=  (2) 
where (t)Hij  is off-farm labor of the ith household member and (t)F
i
j  is time on farm. 
The husband and wife each exhaust available time between on-farm work, off-farm work and 
leisure activities. 
 The budget constraint depends on the wage each member can receive in the labor market, 
(t)W ij ; the value of their time on farm activities as determined by the farm profit function )f(⋅ ; 
and the level of assets accumulated by the household at the start of period t, Aj(t).  The budget 
constraint can be written 
  (t)C)K(t),F(t),f(F(t)(t)HW(t)(t)HW(t)A(t)A jj
w
j
h
j
w
j
w
j
h
j
h
jj
*
j −++=−  (3) 
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where (t)A*j , the value of assets at the end of period t, determines the level of assets carried into 
the beginning of the next period by applying the known rate of return r: 
  (t)1)Ar(t(11)(tA *jj ++=+  (4) 
 The profit function, )f(⋅ , depends on husband’s and wife’s time on the farm and a vector 
of farm attributes, Kj, that are assumed to be time invariant for simplicity.  The profit function is 
concave in all inputs.  In addition, the marginal profit of farm time is assumed to obey 
  ∞→∂∂
→
(t)Ff/ i
0(t)iF
lim  (5) 
where the subscript j has been suppressed.  Condition (5) implies that both the husband and the 
wife will always spend at least some time on farm production.  In addition, for both the husband 
and wife, the marginal profit at zero farm hours is assumed to be strictly greater than the market 
wage rate so that the husband and wife will always spend time on the farm but may or may not 
work off-farm.4   
 Maximizing (1) subject to conditions (2-5), we get the first order conditions 
  
{ }1)λ(tE1)βr(t(1λ(t)
wh,i(t);λ(t)W(t)f λ(t)(t)U
λ(t)(t)U
t
i
FL
c
ii
+++=
=>=
=
 (6) 
where once again, the subscript j has been suppressed.   
 The first two conditions are the usual ones derived from the static model of joint 
household consumption and labor supply.5  The first condition equates the period t marginal 
utility of consumption with the marginal utility of wealth.  The second condition dictates the off-
farm labor supply decision in period t.  The first relation, (t)λ(t)f(t)U ii FL = , always holds with 
 6
equality by assumption (5).  However, the second condition, (t)W(t)f i
Fi
> , will hold with 
equality only if spouse i works off-farm. 
 The off-farm labor supply decision is illustrated for the husband in Figure 1 under the 
simplifying assumption that the wife’s labor supply is fixed.  The first order conditions imply 
that the household will allocate the husband’s work time so as to equalize the household’s 
marginal utility of the husband’s leisure time to the marginal profit from husband’s farm time.  
The optimum will occur at the tangency between the household’s indifference curve (not shown) 
and the budget constraint.  If the tangency occurs at a point on the production function where 
(t)W(t)f hFh > , then the husband will only work on the farm.  This condition will hold as long as 
optimal farm hours are between 0 and hmaxF .  At 
h
maxF , the derivative of the farm profit function 
with respect to Fh equals the husband’s market wage.  Beyond that, (t)W(t)f hFh < , and so the 
household will allocate any additional time to market work: Hh > 0 and hmax
h FF = .  The decision 
process underlying the household’s allocation of the wife’s time is symmetric. 
 For the empirical work later, it is useful to define the household’s labor supply decisions 
in terms of total work time, (t)F(t)H(t)T iii += .  The off-farm labor decision can be specified 
as 
  0(t)Hthen(t),F(t)Tif iimax
i =<  (7A) 
  0(t)Hthen(t),F(t)Tif iimax
i >>  (7B) 
We will return to this specification later. 
 The third condition in (6) relates the marginal utility of wealth in period (t) to that in 
period (t+1).  As the other first-order conditions all relate solely to period (t), the third condition 
summarizes the dynamics of the model. 
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 If there were no uncertainty, λ(t)  would be a known sequence over the lifetime of the 
household.  In practice, the sequence will change over time due to new information on tastes, 
interest rates, and income.  As shown by MaCurdy (1985), changes in the sequences of λ(t) will 
be a random walk with an error term representing new, unanticipated shocks to wealth and hence 
to the marginal utility of wealth. 
Frisch Labor Supply Equations 
 To operationalize the life cycle model to the case of off-farm labor supply decisions of 
husbands and wives, we first define the constant marginal utility of wealth, consumer demand, 
and labor supply functions for each household.6 
  Z(t))K,(t),f(t),f(t),W(t),W(t),C(λC(t) wh FF
hw=  (8A) 
  hw,iZ(t));K,(t),f(t),f(t),W(t),W(t),(λH(t)H wh FF
hwii ==  (8B) 
  hw,iZ(t));K,(t),(t),ff(t),W(t),W(t),(λF(t)F wh FF
hwii ==  (8C) 
where the subscript for each household is suppressed.  The off-farm and on-farm labor supply 
equations imply a total hours of work equation of the form 
    hw,iZ(t));K,(t),f(t),f(t),W(t),W(t),(λT(t)T wh FF
hwii ==  (8D) 
 Before proceeding to the empirical specification, it is useful to illustrate how shocks to 
λ(t)  will affect Ti(t) and Fi(t) and by implication through equation (7), Hi(t).  Consider a 
permanent, positive shock to farm income caused by a positive farm productivity shock, a 
permanent increase in average farm prices or a permanent decrease to farm input prices.  λ(t)  
will fall because of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, as will all future t.t ),tλ( >′′   Rising 
wealth increases leisure consumption, so total work hours Ti(t) decline.  However, (t)f iF  will rise 
while Wi(t) is unchanged, so (t)Fimax  will rise.  Consequently, condition (7A) will more likely be 
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satisfied, and probability of off-farm work will decrease.  Permanent, negative shocks to farm 
income will have the opposite effect, raising Ti(t), lowering (t)Fimax  and increasing the 
probability that (7B) is satisfied. 
 A temporary shock to farm income caused by weather or price shocks that do not affect 
the expectation of future weather or prices will have similar but weaker predicted effects on off-
farm labor.  A positive shock to farm income that does not affect the marginal profitability of 
farm time will lower Ti(t) through the reduction in λ(t) , but (t)f iF  will be unchanged.  Once 
again, condition (7A) will be more likely to be satisfied because of lower Ti(t), but the added 
effect attributable to higher expected farm productivity will not occur. 
 These predictions presume that these transitory shocks have an impact on current period 
farm income.  Previous research on the permanent income hypothesis concentrated on the 
consumption response to transitory income shocks summarized in equation (8A).  A common 
finding for farm households in the United States (Friedman, Reid, Langemeier and Patrick) and 
in developing countries (Paxson, Jacoby and Skoufias) is that transitory income shocks do not 
affect farm household consumption paths.  Some have argued that this suggests that farm 
households can insure themselves against income shocks, whether through financial 
intermediaries that provide insurance (e.g. government price supports, futures markets, or crop 
insurance) or through self-insurance (savings, community risk pooling arrangements).  However, 
if these insurance markets immunize the farm household from transitory shocks, then there 
should be no response of labor supply to these shocks as summarized in (8B-8D).  It may be that 
the mechanism households use to adjust to transitory farm income shocks is by altering 
consumption of leisure so as to maintain their goods consumption path.  Jacoby and Skoufias 
found that rural household in India use child labor to adjust to income shocks, while Skoufias 
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and Parker found that female labor supply responds to income shocks in Mexican urban 
households.  A similar finding for farm households would call into question the conclusion that 
U.S. farm households are insured against transitory income shocks. 
Empirical Formulation 
 To estimate the Frisch off-farm labor supply equation, we need to insert (8B) and (8D) 
into equations (7A-B).  The first item of business is to develop an approximation for the 
unobservable λ(t) .  Following MaCurdy (1985), we can write 
  (t)ε1))(tln(λ(t)a(t))ln(λ jjjj +−+=  (9) 
where aj(t) is a household-specific effect reflecting the jth household's interest rate and discount 
factor and (t)ε j  is the household's forecast error in projecting the marginal utility of wealth.  
Given the stochastic nature of farm production and prices, we assume that these forecast errors 
are dominated by fluctuations in farm profits.  The value of (t)ε j  is observed at the beginning of 
period t and used to make updated projections of 1)).(tln(λ j +   (t)ε j  will have two components, 
(t)εTj  is composed of one-time shocks to the marginal utility of wealth and (t)ε
P
j  is a permanent 
innovation to the marginal utility of wealth. 
 Consider a profit function 
  (t)e(t)SγHKγKγγ(t)π jj3j2j10j ++++=  (10) 
where (t)π j  is net farm income, Kj is a vector of fixed farm capital, HKj is a vector of fixed 
household human capital, and Sj(t) is a vector of time t specific transitory shocks that may 
influence farm profits in period (t).  We take (t)ε Pj = j2j10 HKγKγγ ++  as an estimate of the 
permanent component of the marginal utility of wealth, 1)).(tln(λ j −   We use (t)εTj = (t)Sγ j3  as 
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an estimate of the transitory shock, (t)εTj .  The error term in (10) may have either transitory or 
permanent components. 
 Using our estimates of permanent and transitory components of lnλ(t) from equation 
(10), we approximate (8B) and (8D) by 
  
wh,i(t);η(t)εβ(t)εβ(t)Xββ(t)lnT
wh,i;(t)ψ(t)εα(t)εα(t)Xα α(t)lnF
i
j
T
j
i
3
P
j
i
1j
i
1
i
0
i
j
i
j
T
j
i
3
P
j
i
2j
i
1
i
0
i
j
=++++=
=++++=
 (11) 
where Xj(t) is the vector of all variables that enter the reduced form equations in (8A-D) other 
than λ(t) .  (t)ψ ij  and (t)η
i
j  are error terms that will include errors in the estimation of the 
permanent and transitory components of the marginal utility of wealth, the household-specific 
effect, aj(t),   as well as unmeasured random variation in farm and total hours.  Because the errors 
in estimating (t)εTj  and (t)ε
P
j  will be common across the husband and wife, the error terms in 
their labor supply equations should be positively correlated.  
 We do not estimate (11) directly, but rather the off-farm labor supply equation 
{ }
{ } w.h,i;(t)ξ(t))εα(β(t))εα(β(t))Xα(β)α(βProb
0(t))ln(F(t))ln(TProb
i
j
T
j
i
3
i
3
P
j
i
2
i
2j
i
1
i
1
i
0
i
0
i
j
i
j
=>−+−+−+−=
>−
 (12) 
where (t)).(t)(η(t)ξ ij
i
j
i
j ϕ−−=   For simplicity, we assume that (t)ξ ij  are distributed bivariate 
normal with 0>hwρ  representing the correlation in the errors between the husband and wife.  
Under normality, we can estimate (12) using a bivariate probit specification. 
Data Description 
 The data on individual, household and farm characteristics were obtained from a survey 
of 276 Iowa farmers and their spouses conducted in August 2000.  Means, standard deviations, 
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and definition of the variables included in the survey are given in Table 2.  The survey elicited 
information on farm husband's and wife's ages and education levels, demographic composition of 
the household, and information on the type and size of the farm operation.   
 There are three endogenous variables: farmer and spouse off-farm labor supply and farm 
income.  Off-farm labor supply for spouse i is measured by a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if i works off the farm.  The husband and wife were each asked if they worked off-farm for 
pay and the number of hours per week worked. 
The other endogenous variable is farm income, which must be decomposed into 
permanent and transitory components.  The survey asked the respondent about their level of net 
farm income in 1999.   This was measured by the farmer's selection of a dollar range in which 
the farm income fell, where the ranges included varied from less than $25,000 to more than 
$200,000.  Farmers were disproportionately located in the bottom two farm income groupings, 
with two-thirds in the bottom group and one-quarter in the next lowest group.  There were 
farmers in each of the other farm income groups.  Nevertheless, the limited variation could have 
proven problematic in deriving precise estimates of the permanent and transitory income 
components, a problem that did not prove severe in the actual estimation below.7 
The derivation of the permanent component of farm income requires information on 
time-invariant farm physical capital and farmer human capital.  These measures were collected in 
the survey.  The farm physical capital measures include total landholdings and the acreage in 
crop land and pasture land.  The type of farm operation is represented by a series of dummy 
variables indicating if the farm has hogs, beef cattle, dairy cattle, or other animal agriculture.  
The farm’s location in the state and the proportion of acreage owned are also included under 
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physical capital.  Measures of human capital include the age and years of schooling of the farm 
husband and wife. 
Transitory shocks to farm income included both weather and price shocks.  Weather 
shocks were measured by the 1999 rainfall by month relative to the average over the previous ten 
years.  County rainfall estimates from 1989 to 1999 were obtained from the Iowa Environmental 
Mesonet .  The price shock measure was specific to each farm operation mix.  Data on Iowa 
prices of corn, soybeans, hogs, cattle, milk, and other commodities from 1989 to 1999 was 
available from the USDA's Iowa Agricultural Statistics.  The farm-specific price is the weighted 
sum of these prices where the weights were the share of total farm income from each 
commodity.  In other words, if sjk is the share of the kth farm commodity in farm j's income and 
pkt is the kth commodity price in year t, the expected price for farm j across all commodities is 
∑∑T
t j
ktjk  )/Tp(s .  The price shock for the farm is the ratio of the 1999 farm-specific weighted 
price to the average farm-specific weighted price over the previous ten years.  This can be 
interpreted as the farm's proportional price surprise.8  
The other county-specific variables that were merged into our survey data included a 
measure of local farmland price obtained from the Iowa State University Agricultural Land 
Value Survey.  In addition, the proximity of the county to a metropolitan area was measured by a 
dummy variable indicating if the county was not adjacent to an urban county.  
Results 
 We first estimated equation (10) to derive estimates of the permanent and transitory 
innovations to wealth for the farm household.  These estimates are reported in Table 3.  Expected 
farm income was driven primarily by the size of the farm.  Farm income rose at an increasing 
rate with the number of acreage in crops, suggesting increasing returns to scale over the range of 
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farm sizes in the sample.  Cash grain farmers earned more than hog and cattle farmers.  Farm 
income did not vary by age or education of the farmer or spouse in this sample, and it did not 
vary by area of the state or by the proportion of land owned versus rented. 
 Rainfall deviations from the norm did not explain variation in farm income, either 
individually or jointly.  While 1999 was modestly drier than average, the lower than average  
rainfall occurred in April when rain disrupts planting.   Consequently, the lack of income effects 
attributable to weather shocks was presumably due to the lack of important weather deviations in 
that crop year.  On the other hand, price surprises had a large impact on farm incomes in 1999.  
Not surprisingly, farmers whose operations were heavily weighted toward commodities with 
positive price shocks experienced positive farm income shocks.    
For each farm, the sum of the first 15 coefficients in Table 3 times their respective 
variables generates our measures of (t)ε pj and the remaining 6 terms are used to generate (t)ε
T
j .
9  
These were inserted into our bivariate probit estimating equation (12).  Results are reported in 
Table 4.  Reported standard errors correct for the two-step estimation process using a 
bootstrapping procedure with 100 replications. 
The labor supply equations mimic earlier findings from studies using static models of  
off-farm labor supply, although not all coefficients are precisely estimated.  Probability of 
working off farm rises at a decreasing rate in the age of both the husband and the wife.  The peak 
probability of working off-farm occurs at age 47 for the husband and age 45 for the wife and 
declines thereafter.  Husband's schooling raises the probability of his own off-farm labor but 
reduces probability of his wife working off-farm, although the coefficients estimates are not 
precise.  Symmetric effects of wife's schooling on her own and her husband’s labor supply are 
obtained with a large impact of wife's education on her off-farm labor supply.  In addition, the 
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error terms in husband's and wife's equations are significantly and positively correlated as 
required by the theory 
Keeping in mind that we hold the components of farm income constant, larger farms raise 
the probability of off farm labor for both husband and wife, albeit the effects do not differ 
significantly from zero.  Taken literally, the coefficients imply that if there are two farms making 
the same expected profit, we would expect greater off-farm labor participation from the farm 
couple on the larger of the two farms. Husbands on farms raising livestock are less likely to work 
off-farm, as are husbands on farms more distant from the city.  Neither of those factors affect the 
off-farm labor supply of wives.  Presence of children has no impact on off-farm labor decisions 
of either spouse. 
 This brings us to the main topic, which is the impact of the permanent and transitory 
components of farm income.  The permanent component should have a negative effect on off-
farm labor supply.  If the farm is fully insured against transitory farm income fluctuations, then 
the transitory shock should have no effect on off-farm labor.  However, if the farm is liquidity 
constrained or not fully insured, then transitory shocks may have an effect.  The permanent 
components do have large and significant negative effects on the off-farm labor supply of both 
the husband and the wife.  The null hypothesis of equal off-farm labor supply responses to Pε   
for the husband and the wife could not be rejected.  Therefore, we find strong evidence that farm 
households condition their off-farm labor supply decisions on the expected profitability of their 
farm operations. 
The temporary farm income shock also has a negative effect on off-farm labor supply, 
and it is significantly negative for the wife.10   The wife's response to Tε  differs significantly 
from that of the husband, suggesting that time use of farm wives reacts more elastically to 
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transitory fluctuations in farm income.  This finding implies that farm households absorb 
negative farm income shocks in part by increasing off-farm labor hours and reducing hours of 
leisure consumed, particularly by farm wives.   
 Table 5 contains the labor supply elasticities computed from the bivariate probit 
coefficients, evaluated at sample means.11  Probability of off-farm labor supply declines with 
own age and increases with own education.   Cross effects of education on spouse's labor supply 
are very small.  These effects are common in the static off-farm labor supply literature.  Our 
main interest is in the off-farm labor supply responses to Pε and Tε .  While we know of no other 
comparable estimates of labor supply responses to transitory and permanent farm income shocks 
based on U.S. micro data, these will provide a frame of reference for other studies.12  Clearly, the 
permanent component of farm income has a strong negative effect on off-farm labor supply of 
both spouses.  However, the elasticities with respect to transitory shocks to farm income are also 
large enough to suggest quite flexible flows into and out of off-farm labor, particularly for farm 
wives. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study shows that the long-standing findings in the U.S. and elsewhere that the 
consumption of goods by farm households was consistent with the permanent income hypothesis 
may be incorrect.  In particular, off-farm labor supply and implied consumption of leisure appear 
to respond significantly to farm income shocks, consistent with the findings of liquidity 
constraints in farm inventory and investment decisions.   Our results suggest that farm 
households insulate themselves from adverse farm income shocks in part by adjusting off-farm 
labor.   
 16
 This study must be viewed as suggestive in that it only has access to a single cross-
section.  A definitive test would require longitudinal data.  A long series of repeated observations 
on individual farms would allow greater variation in weather conditions that would help in 
identifying the impact of rainfall shocks on farm income.  Repeated observations would also 
allow fixed-effect estimation that would be an alternative method for controlling the 
unobservable marginal utility of wealth.  Our reliance on the correlation in the error terms 
between the husband's and wife's off-farm labor supply equations may not fully control for the 
time-invariant household effect.  Finally, longitudinal data would allow us to observe if spells of 
off-farm labor are short and driven by transitory income shocks, or if once farm households enter 
off-farm labor the attachment becomes permanent.  Nevertheless, our results are consistent with 
previous static empirical models of off-farm labor supply in the U.S. and with findings from 
developing country data sets that labor supply responds to income shocks, even if consumption 
does not.  
 17
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Figure 1:  Hours allocation of the husband (h), holding the time allocation of the wife fixed. 
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Table 1. Off-Farm Work Status by Age of Husbanda 
Off-farm Work Status <45 45-54 55-64 >64 Total 
Both work off farm 47 45 24 3 119 
 (65.2) (58.4) (54.2) (4.4) (43.1) 
 
Husband only works off farm 4 6 8 9 27 
 (5.5) (7.8) (13.6) (13.2) (9.8) 
 
Wife only works off farm 9 20 12 9 50 
 (12.5) (26.0) (20.3) (13.2) (18.1) 
 
Neither works off farm 12 6 15 47 80 
 (16.6) (7.8) (25.4) (69.1) (29) 
 
Total 72 77 59 68 276 
 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
 
aTop number is the number of households in the age/labor supply category and the percentage of 
households in the age category is reported in parentheses.
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Table 2. Data Definitions and Descriptive Statistics, Iowa Farm Household, 1999 
Variable Variable Description Mean Standard Error
Net Farm Endogenous Income Farm income category 1.878 1.21 
HusOfFm Husband works off farm (0=no, 1=yes) .529 .50 
WifeOfFm Wife Works off farm (0=no, 1=yes) .634 .48 
Exogenous    
HusAge Husband's age (year) 54.35 13.44 
HusEdu Husband's education (year) 13.00 1.79 
WifeAge Wife's age (year) 52.23 13.02 
WifeEdu Wife's education (year) 13.31 1.45 
Children Number of children under age 18 0.79 1.16 
LnFarmAc Log(acres of land)) 5.42 1.39 
LnCropld Log(Crop land acres) 4.88 1.92 
LnPastld Log(Pasture acres) 1.99 2.01 
HogFarm Hog farm .141 .348 
CattleFarm Cattle farm .351 .478 
DairyFarm Dairy farm .029 .168 
OtherFarm Other livestock farm .054 .227 
Ratiown Ratio of owned to total land .606 1.02 
South Southern Iowa County (1-south 0-north) 0.431 0.496 
West Western Iowa County (1-west 0-east) 0.496 0.501 
DRainApr Derivation from average rainfall: April -2.686 1.439 
DRainMay Derivation from average rainfall: May -0.441 1.784 
DRainJun Derivation from average rainfall: June 0.0432 1.365 
DRainJul Derivation from average rainfall: July -0.944 3.147 
DRainAug Derivation from average rainfall: August 0.596 1.682 
Lvstck If farm has any type of livestock 0.504 0.501 
Dist Metro Distance from Metro (0-2) 1.344 0.734 
UFPShk Unit free price shock (measures change in 
value of production) 
-0.226 0.067 
εP Permanent Income Shock  4.95 1.410 
εT Temporary Income Shock -1.84 0.503 
D Correlation in off-farm labor supply error terms 
between husband and wife 
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Table 3.  Ordered Probit Estimates of Net Farm Income equation (10). 
 Coefficient  
HusAge .025 
(.031) 
 
WifeAge .005 
(.031) 
 
HusEdu .056 
(.058) 
 
WifeEdu -.048  
(.071)   
 
LnFarmAc .019*  
(.451) 
 
LnCropld .435**  
(159) 
 
LnPastld .062 
(.060) 
 
LnFarmAc2 .045** 
(.017) 
 
HogFarm -.407 
(.275) 
 
CattleFarm -.596*  
 (.309) 
 
DairyFarm -.298   
 (.516) 
 
OtherFarm .181 
(.363) 
 
Ratioown -.102  
 (.251) 
 
South -.280  
  (.291) 
 
West -.141    
(.240) 
 
RainDfApril .053  
  (.077) 
 
RainDfMay .028 
(.056)   
 
RainDfJun -.008 
(.074) 
 
RainDfJul -.018 
(.041) 
 
RainDfAug -.060 
(.064) 
 
UFPShk 7.089** 
(2.53) 
 
N =  266 
Log likelihood = -203.2    
Pseudo R2       =     0.2233 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4.  Bivariate probit estimation of the off-farm labor participation equation (12). 
 
 Husband Wife 
Variable   
Hus Age .188** 
(.070) 
 
(Hus Age2)/100 -.199*** 
(.063) 
 
Wife Age  .237** 
(.097) 
(Wife Age2)/100  -265** 
(.090) 
Hus Edu .071 
(.075) 
-.082 
(.082) 
WifeEdu -.026 
(.083) 
.265** 
(.079) 
Children .006 
(.123) 
-.058 
(1.38) 
Ln Farm Ac .281 
(.242) 
.364 
(.242) 
Lvstk -.775** 
(.272) 
.289 
(.316) 
Dist Metro -.221 
(.147) 
-.044 
(.147) 
εP -.642** 
(.223) 
-.673** 
(.237) 
εT -.141 
(.316) 
-.822** 
(.337) 
D  .336**  
 (.118) 
 
   
N 266  
Log Likelihood -247.9  
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 5.  Estimated off-farm labor supply elasticitiesa 
 
 Husband Wife 
   
Own Age -0.41 
 
-0.57 
Hus Edu 0.46 -.029 
 
Wife Edu -.001 0.95 
 
Children .002 -0.01 
 
Ln Farm Ac 0.14 0.10 
 
Lvstk -0.19 
 
0.04 
Dist Metro -0.15 -0.02 
 
εP -1.59 
 
-0.90 
εT -0.13 -0.41 
   
aEvaluated at sample means from Table 2, using coefficients from Table 4. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Brady showed that farm household savings behavior was more responsive to current income 
than nonfarm households.  Reid showed that farm household consumption was less sensitive to 
current income than nonfarm households.  Both tests are consistent with farm households 
attempting to smooth consumption because of higher variance in income streams.  Reid refers 
conceptually to permanent and transitory income components in explaining why farm 
households would have a smaller elasticity of consumption with respect to current income, but 
the formal derivation of the permanent income hypothesis is credited to Friedman.  
 
2 A difficulty with tying increased off-farm labor supply to higher variance of farm income is 
that the causality may be reversed.  Farm households that engage in off-farm labor may 
experience higher variation in farm income  because poorer farmers are more likely to work off 
farm, because types of farm operation that are conducive to off-farm labor are subject to larger 
price or yield shocks, or because off-farm labor lowers time available for farm monitoring or 
management.  
 
3 Examples of the literature examining the labor supply decisions of farm husbands and wives in 
the face of fully anticipated income include Huffman and Lange (1989), Lass, Findeis and 
Hallberg (1989), Tokle and Huffman (1991), Weersink (1992), Weersink and Weerhewa (1998) 
and Abdulai and Delgado (1999). 
 
4 This is not overly restrictive, as hours on the farm operation would include all management, 
accounting, and financial decisions regarding the farm's operation as well as the animal and crop 
production activities themselves.  It is likely that both farm wives and their husbands participate 
in at least some of these functions, if not all. 
 
5 See for example Huffman and Lange (1989) or Tokle and Huffman (1991). 
 
6 These are known as Frisch functions.  See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of the 
use of Frisch functions in labor supply estimation. 
 
7 In future replications, survey design may want to consider smaller income ranges, at least at the 
lower tail of the distribution of net farm incomes. 
 
8 We also tried an alternative measure that separated out each commodity weighted price 
deviation between 1999 and its average over the previous ten years.  Results in the second stage 
were similar in sign to those using the aggregated price shocks.  We worried that when the price 
shock was separated out by commodity, it would be clouded by type of farm, because the size of 
the same commodity price shock would vary by the importance of that commodity in the farm's 
sales.  For example, if the farm did not raise a commodity, the measured farm price shock would 
be zero.  To the extent that the measured price shock partially controlled for type of farm, 
permanent components of farm income would pollute our estimate of the transitory shock.  
Therefore, we prefer the aggregated price shock measure. 
 
9 The predicted values are continuos and ignore the estimated break points in the ordered probit.  
The units are not directly interpretable other than higher values imply higher income.   
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10 When we used the alternative specification of the transitory price shock mentioned in footnote 
7, both husband's and wife's off-farm labor supply responded had significant negative responses 
to transitory income shocks.  
 
11 We also computed analytically derived elasticities.  Magnitudes exceeded the reported 
elasticities in Table 5 by from one-quarter to one-third, but qualitative interpretations were 
unchanged 
 
12 Huffman (1979) reported estimates of elasticities of off-farm days worked with respect to 
transitory farm income, using county-level data from the 1964 Census of Agriculture.  His 
estimates were -0.15 and significant for husbands, but 0.02 and insignificant for wives.   
